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Abstract of the paper  
The paper illustrates a theoretical model of real option value applied to the 
problem of land development. 
Making use of the 1998 2001 Kyrgyz Household Budget Survey, we show that 
when  the  hypothesis  of  decreasing  return  to  scale  holds,  the  relation  between  the 
threshold value of revenue per hectare and the amount of land cultivated is positive. In 
addition to that, the relation between the threshold and the amount of land owned is 
positive  in  the  case  of  continuous  supply  of  land  and  negative  when  there  is 
discontinuous supply of land. The direct consequence is that, in the first case, smaller 
farms will be more willing to rent land and exercise the option where, in the second 
case, larger farms will exercise first. 
The results corroborate the findings of the theoretical model and suggest three 
main conclusions: (i) the combination of uncertainty and irreversibility is a significant 
factor in the land development decisions, (ii) farmers’ behaviour is consistent with the 
continuous profit maximization model, (iii) farming unit revenue tends to be positively 
related to farm size, once uncertainty is properly accounted for. 
Keywords: Option value theory, Farm size, Uncertainty, irreversibility.  
JEL codes O13, Q12, Q15, Q18 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
Transition economies of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union started 
the  privatization  process,  during  the  nineties,  under  fairly  similar  conditions  but 
followed  distinct  mechanisms  of  land  privatization  and  completed  the  process  at 
varying points in time (Csaki, 2000). Two well defined forms of farm organization 
have resulted after the post socialist land and farm structure reforms. On the one hand, 
countries that experienced distribution in kind or in share of land, such as most of the 
Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) of the Former Soviet Union (FSU), or for 
countries, such as Albania, that undergone an radical and egalitarian distribution of 
land to rural families, the dominant farm structure is small family farms. On the other 
hand, when restitution or a mixed strategy was chosen, as in the majority of Central 
and Eastern European countries (CEE) countries, large scale farms are the dominant 
form of agriculture organization (Lerman, 2004; Vranken and Swinnen, 2006).  
The evolution and the development of land market varied across countries, and 
was  largely  originated  by  differences  in  resource  endowments,  commodity 
characteristics, market imperfections, and the nature of the land reform (Lerman et al., 
2004; Deininger, 2003). Unclear and insecure property rights, legal restrictions on land 
operations, high transaction costs, market constraints such as credit, and the lack of 
collateral mechanisms have delayed the possibility of investing in land. The degree of 
uncertainty, that has characterized the evolution of land market development in these 
countries,  has  been  always  very  high,  together  with  an  insecure  environment  for 
investments,  and  legal  restrictions  on  acquisition  of  agricultural  land.  Empirical 
evidence has shown that thin rental market has emerged in labour intensive agricultural 
economies  that  undergone  radical  distribution,  whereas,  in  capital  intensive 
agricultural countries, the restitution strategy favored the development of large scale 
corporate farms, and rental options are more widespread.  
The paper illustrates a theoretical model of real option value applied to the 
problem of land development based on an objective risk analysis. When deciding to 
develop  land,  farmers  have  to  measure  market  uncertainty,  and,  in  particular,  the 
volatility of revenue caused by market, output, and legal uncertainty.  
Until  recently,  the  net  present  value  (NPV)  analysis  has  been  the  standard 
methodology used for real investment decisions. This type of rule suggests that the 
investment decision is “now or never”. Farmers will develop new land if and only if 
the price of land is higher or equal to the present value of the future revenue they can 
obtain. This approach does not consider the possibility of waiting before taking the 
decision  to  develop  land  when  there  is  uncertainty  and  the  decision  may  entail 
irreversible  loss.  The  decision  to  develop  new  land  will  involve  the  loss  of  some 
options and the acquisition of others. Farmer could be in autarchy and cultivate their 
endowment or rent in or buy land at a future date. The presence of additional options 
available to the farmer could justify the price of land been larger than the present value 
of the stream of revenue. 
The fact that farmers can choose to keep land undeveloped for long period of 
time suggests that land could be more valuable if developed in the future instead of 
cultivating  now.  Hence,  in  order  to  understand  what  are  the  reasons  that  induce 
farmers to keep land undeveloped instead of, in example, renting or buying it, we 
propose to integrate the traditional analysis with a more recent approach based on the    3 
so called option value of investment. The aim of the paper is to analyze the problem of 
land development using a real option approach. Uncertainty, irreversibility and farmers 
options are analyzed to derive the optimal decision making rule, that is the optimal 
switching  value  that  induce  farmers  to  cultivate  additional  land.  Contrary  to  the 
traditional approach, this model allows to make an analysis focusing on objective risk. 
The option to develop new land can be considered a “call” option, i.e. the right for the 
farmer to acquire additional pieces of land should his revenue per hectare be above a 
certain critical level (the threshold value). Our model considers two extreme cases: the 
problem of continuous supply of land and the case of discontinuous supply of land, 
that is when the farmer can develop only pieces of land of an exogenously given size. 
Besides  incorporating  the  option  value  to  waiting  to  invest,  this  approach 
emphasizes the important role of uncertainty in investment decisions. In particular, as 
we will examine in detail, the real option approach suggests that land development 
decisions should be very sensitive to the level of revenue uncertainty. Any increase in 
revenue uncertainty may, in fact, postpone the development activity. Investigating the 
relationship  between  uncertainty,  revenue  and  land  development  motivates  the 
theoretical and empirical analysis found in this study.  
In order to test empirically the theoretical model, we use data from the 1998 
2001 Household Budget Survey of Kyrgyz Republic. The results of the analysis show 
that there is a positive relation the threshold value of the revenue per hectare, and 
uncertainty. In addition to that, the relation between the threshold and the amount of 
land owned is positive in the case of continuous supply of land and negative when 
there is discontinuous supply of land. The direct consequence is that, in the first case, 
smaller farms will be more willing to rent land and exercise the option where, in the 
second case, larger farms will exercise first.  
The structure of the paper is as follow: Section 1 introduces the analysis of land 
development under a real option approach. Section two illustrates a theoretical model 
of real option value applied to the problem of land development. Section three aims at 
testing empirically the theoretical results developed in the previous section in order to 
analyze the relation between environmental variability, the threshold of unit revenue 
and the decision to develop land. The last section provides conclusions and policy 
implications. 
 
1. LAND DEVELOPMENT UNDER REAL OPTION APPROACH 
In a world of perfect information, complete market and zero transaction costs, 
the distribution of land ownership will affect households’ welfare, but will not matter 
for efficiency outcomes and every farmer would cultivate his optimum farm size.  
A farmer may have a number of different options while deciding to cultivate 
some land, but only limited resources for doing so. The existence of a multiple mode 
of  production  that  is  cultivating  the  own  endowment,  renting  in  land  or  buying 
additional land, in the presence of budget constraints makes the valuation of a farm 
household profit maximization behavior interesting.  
It is optimal for a farm to evaluate a number of opportunities in order to see 
which of these options is the most profitable. Determining the optimal farm size can be 
thought as a sum of individual options that may provide, in some case, a high and 
optimistic value. Rather than an analogy with a sum of options, a better solution could 
be to find a ranking of opportunities such as first best, second best and so on.     4 
It is necessary to recognize that a farm is a combination of assets and options 
that are linked to each other. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) showed that a firm could have 
several investments on hold at different stages of the investment process, waiting for 
the critical moment in which to exercise the option. Some of the potential investments 
are  optimally  deferred  while  others,  exceeding  a  critical  value  or  threshold,  are 
exercised.  For  example,  assuming  no  exercise constraints and complete  markets, a 
farmer could consider an infinity of farm expansion plans and this would make the 
sum of options value go to infinity. However, in presence of exercise constraints, a 
farmer has to decide, at every point of time, which option to exercise against the next 
best alternative, and so on, until all the opportunities are exhausted.  
A farmer may have a sequence of options the first of which is cultivating its 
own endowment of land and the second one to cultivate additional land at future date. 
Previous  works  by  Titman  (1985)  and  Williams  (1991)  analyzed  the  development 
decision of a vacant land as an option to develop a completed building in a second 
moment. They used this analogy to develop models that used financial call option 
methodology  to  explain  the  valuation  of  land  and  the  factors  that  affect  the 
development/construction decision.  
In the case of the farmer’s decision making process, a real option model can 
show that the source of land value comes from the right to obtain an underlying asset 
(or, in this case, an additional revenue from cultivating further pieces of land), by 
paying the exercise price as represented by the rental cost or the sale price of land. An 
investment opportunity is like a call option because the farmer has the right, but not the 
obligation, to acquire something, that is, additional revenue. If we could find, on the 
financial  market,  a  security  or  a  mix  of  securities  whose  return  and  volatility  are 
sufficiently similar to those assured by the investment contemplated by the farmer, the 
value of the option on this security would reflect the value of farmer opportunity. 
Unfortunately, this is not an easy task, as the likelihood of finding a similar option on 
the stock market is very low.  
By drawing the characteristics of farmer opportunity in the prospective call 
option, we can obtain a model of a project that combines its characteristics with the 
structure of a call option.   
Many  projects  involve  committing  resources  to  produce  future  revenues. 
Investing resources to develop such opportunities is analogous to exercise an option. 
The value of the resources committed equals to the option’s exercise price. The present 
value of the future revenues expected corresponds to the price of the underlying stock. 
In the case of a farm, this additional revenue is what the farmer may expect to obtain 
by taking the decision to cultivate (by renting, buying or developing) additional pieces 
of  land.  The  length  of  time  the  farmer  can  defer  the  decision  without  losing  the 
opportunity to acquire more land corresponds to the option’s time to expiration. The 
volatility of the project’s cash flow, namely, the risk of the project, corresponds to the 
standard deviation of return on the stock. The opportunity cost of time is given by the 
risk free rate of return.  
Traditionally, opportunities have been evaluated using the discounted cash flow 
approach (DCF) by computing the net present value (NPV) of a project. The NPV of a 
project is the algebraic sum of the present values of all inflows and outflows that are 
expected to be associated with the opportunity. If the NPV is greater than zero, the 
benefits  generated  by  the  opportunity  are  greater  than  the  costs  and  therefore  the 
project will generate wealth. Risk in these cash flows is incorporated in the discounting    5 
procedure  by  a  risk adjusted  discount  rate.  This  methodology  reduces  to  a  single 
scenario  all  the  information  available  on  a  specific  project  and  takes  into  account 
uncertainty only as deviation from this specific scenario, by neglecting and project 
flexibility.  
Real option is incorporated in cost benefit analysis by means of the so called 
extended net present value (ENPV). This procedure (Pennisi and Scandizzo, 2003) 
includes in the value created by the project, that is, its expected cash flow, the value 
created  or  destroyed  in  terms  of  risks  and  opportunities.  Traditional  cost  benefit 
analysis is based on a subjective assessment of the decision making process as the 
variables taken into consideration depend on the hypothesis of the decision maker’s 
utility function and, in particular, are reduced or identified with the increase of the 
expected  value computed  at  market  prices.  In contrast,  real  option  value  theory  is 
based on the hypothesis that a project with uncertain returns can be evaluated through 
the observed market value, in an efficient market, of a similar asset or a combination 
of assets (contingent claim valuation) characterized by the same expected returns and 
volatility. Thus, the new methodology uncovers an “objective” side of uncertainty that 
integrates the subjective side of the traditional expected utility method. 
2. A MODEL FOR FARM HOUSEHOLDS PROFIT MAXIMIZATION 
In this section we develop a model  and an estimation equation in order to 
identify factors that would increase or decrease the probability of participation in land 
markets in a framework of land ownership, land markets and the decision to develop 
land.  
The conceptual model is based on a farmer who may choose to cultivate its 
own land and/or has the choice to acquire, rent or develop new land. 
Cultivating land is supposed to generate unit revenue (per hectare or per unit of 
output) evolving according to a stochastic process of the geometric Brownian motion, 
that is:  
dy ydt ydz α σ = +                           (2.1) 
where α  is the drift rate, a positive constant for which the probability of an 
increase  of  y  is  greater  than  a  diminution.  σ   is  the  volatility  of  the  process, 
t dz dt ε = is the increment of a Wiener process such that  0 Edz =  and 
2 Edz dt =  is a 
white noise i.i.d. Equation (2.1) implies that the current value of unit revenue is known 
but his future values are log normally distributed with a variance that grows linearly 
with time.  
The option to invest (for example develop land) in an extra hectare of land can 
be considered a “call” option, i.e. a faculty, given to the farmer, to acquire additional 
pieces of land, should the perspective revenue per hectare be above a certain critical 
level. The value of such an option, F(y), can either be determined by replicating it with 
a portfolio of assets and liabilities (see Dixit and Pindyck, p.189) or, more simply, by 
using  dynamic  programming.  The  Bellman  equation,  in  fact,  prescribes  that,  an 
optimal sequence of decisions, in a multistage optimization problem, has the property 
that whatever the initial decisions, the remaining choices must constitute an optimal 
sequence  of  decisions  for  the  remaining  problem  with  respect  to  the  sub  problem 
starting at the state that results from the initial decision. In this case, the total expected 
return of the investment decision opportunity (that is developing land) is equal to its 
expected rate of capital appreciation:    6 
( ) ( ) F y y EdF y ρ = +                          (2.2) 
Where  ρ  is an appropriate rate of discount reflecting the farmer’s opportunity cost for 
delaying consumption as well as his degree of risk aversion. It has to be note that the 
dynamic  programming  method  requires  the  specification  of  the  discount  rate  as  a 
subjective  parameter.  Conversely,  the  contingent  claim  valuation  (i.e.  the  portfolio 
replicating technique) does not require any subjective parameter because it relies on 
the existence of a market for risky activities. Nonetheless, given that the results are the 
same using both methodologies, except for the interpretation on the parameterρ , the 
determination of the preferences of the farmer with respect to time and risk does not 
change the analysis and may pose a problem only in the empirical specification. 
The value of the farmer’s wealth is equal to the value of the future stream of 
revenue per hectare plus the expected capital gain from the increment in value of the 
asset
1.  
Equation (2.2) states that in order to maximize the present value of the option, 
the  farmer  has  to  equate,  in  continuing  time,  the  value  that  he  would  obtain  by 
exercising the option, to the expected present value of the future gains obtained by 
holding the option. This equation may be used to determine the functional form of the 
option value function. Solving equation (2.2) (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) after applying 
Ito’s lemma yields a partial differential equation whose general solution is: 
 
1 2
1 2 ( ) F y A y A y
β β = +                           (2.3) 
where  1 A  and  2 A  are two constants determined by boundary conditions and  1 β  
and  2 β   are,  respectively,  the  positive  and  the  negative  root  of  the  characteristic 
equation:  
2 ( 1) 0
2
β
ρ βα β σ − − − =                        (2.4) 
In particular from Dixit and Pindyck, pp. 142 143  
2
1 1 2 2 2




ρ δ ρ δ ρ
β β
σ σ σ
− −   = − + + >    
                  (2.5) 
and  
2
2 2 2 2 2




ρ δ ρ δ ρ
β β
σ σ σ
− −   = − − + <    
                  (2.6) 
The value of the option to cultivate the land should decrease with any decrease 
in the cash flow generated by the land under cultivation. But the second term on the 
right hand side of (2.3) goes to infinity as  y  goes to zero. Thus, the constant  2 A  must 
be zero.  
                                                 
1 
y
δ  represents the expected present value of the yield stream  t y , when its initial value 
is  y .     7 
The farmer has different options: he can cultivate his endowment of land,  q, 
and be in autarchy. Otherwise, he can cultivate his land and rent in extra amount of 
land. He can rent out land or operate a mix strategy: rent in land and rent out part of his 
endowment.  
2.1. Case 1. Continuous supply of land and decreasing return to scale
2 
Landowners are supposed to hold the option to invest in additional land  i q  at a 
given rate 
* r r ρ = . Yield is assumed to follow a Brownian process as identified in 
equation (2.1).  
Assume that the farmer contemplates the possibility of investing in additional 
farmland  i q q q = −   where  i q   is  the  additional  amount  of  cultivated  land,  q  his 
endowment of land and q is the total land cultivated hectares of land. 
Farm operating profit, π , is determined according to the following equation 
( ) ( )( 1)
T y c
f q q f q q e
ρ π
δ ρ
= − − − −                     (2.7) 





−  as  r . For the time being, we 
consider only the land input. As before, revenue per unit of output, i.e. the random 
variable  y  is supposed to follow a geometric Brownian motion as described in (2.1). 
In addition,  ( ) f q  is a neoclassical production function with the standard properties  
0 0 f f
′ ′′ > , <  
The  farmer  can  develop  land  at  the  costc,  which  includes  all  on  farm 
investment. We assume that this cost is sunk and the investment is irreversible.  
We assume that the operating profit flow is such that the farmer does not have 
the option to suspend or abandon the cultivation.  
The objective of the farmer is to maximize the expected present value of profit. 
The discount rate is given and equal to  ρ . The farmer cultivates his own endowment 
and  has  to  decide  whether  to  develop  land  on  the  basis  of  costs  and  benefits  of 
cultivating additional pieces of land.  
The  optimal  policy  is  described  by  an  upward sloping  threshold  curve 
( ) y y q = . In the region above the curve, it is optimal to develop more land in a lump to 
move immediately to the threshold curve. In the region below the curve, inaction, and 
therefore,  cultivating  the  previous  amount,  is  optimal.  The  farmer  waits  until  the 
stochastic process of  y  moves vertically to  ( ) y q , and then develops land just enough 
to keep from crossing the threshold.  
 
 
                                                 
2  The  model  is  similar  to  Dixit  (1995)  except  for  the  field  of  application  i.e.  the 














We are assuming that there is a continuous supply of land, that is, the farmer 
can develop additional marginal pieces of land of any size. The farmer cultivates his 
own initial level and, in addition, has the option of develop additional pieces of land. 





                          (2.8) 
In order to maximize profit, the first order condition is:  
'( ) ( )
y
f q r q q
δ
= −                         (2.9) 
That is, the value of the marginal productivity of land has to be equal to the 
development cost the farmer has to pay to expand continuously the amount of land he 
cultivates.  
Developing land gives the farmer two distinct choice variables: the size of land 
cultivated and the time at which exercise the option (or the threshold value of the 
revenue per hectare).  On  one hand, farmers have to decide  the  size  of the plot to 
develop. In this respect, farmer will continue to develop land as long as the marginal 
revenue on land, i.e. the productivity of land is larger or equal to the development cost. 
This decision problem can be solved by means of the classical maximization process 
solving  the  first  order  condition  of  profit  maximization  (2.9).  After  deciding  the 
optimal amount of cultivated land, farmers have to decide whether and when exercise 
the option to develop further amounts of land. The farmer will exercise the option 
when the value of the option to develop is greater or equal to the marginal benefit that 
is the threshold value. This second decision can be solved by means of a dynamic 
optimization process. Given the stochastic process followed by the production output 
y  given by (2.1), we can derive the value of land development decision. Given this 
value, we are able to find the value of the option to develop additional amount of land 
and the critical value of the threshold of the revenue per hectare at which it is optimal 
to develop new land. Solving with Bellman equation, the option value will satisfy a 
differential equation subject to boundary conditions and for the value matching and 
smooth pasting conditions at the critical value of 
* y  at which the farmer should decide 
to develop new land.  
The value matching condition states that, in order to develop more land, the 






)  Develop land 
q  
y  
Gradual developing    9 
his own endowment plus the option to develop land and the revenue he could earn by 
doing so. In the continuous case the farmer must be indifferent between the increment 
of revenue obtained by cultivating his own endowment and the additional revenue 
obtained by developing more land.  
1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
y y y
f q Ay f q q f q r q q
β
δ δ δ
′ ′ ′ + = − + − −                 (2.10) 
Developing the value matching and the smooth pasting conditions gives the 
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The threshold value of 
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Under  uncertainty  and  irreversibility,  land  should  thus  be  developed  when 
marginal revenue significantly exceeds development marginal costs.  
Since 
' f  is positive,  y  is increasing in q and decreasing in q , as shown in the 
previous picture;  y
∗, the threshold value, is a positive function of the parameter of 
uncertainty  1 β , which is a decreasing function of the volatility of the process, and, 
finally, a decreasing function of the marginal product of land. Of importance, for the 







 is greater than one 





















. In other words, if the variance of the 
revenue increases, then the multiplier increases and the development decision to rent in 
must satisfy a higher threshold.  
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For the same reason the derivative of the threshold function with respect to 















                    (2.14)    10 
 
Proposition  1:  In  the  case  of  a  production  technology  with  decreasing 
returns to scale, and with unlimited alternatives for developing additional land 
with continuity, the threshold level of revenue per hectare 
* y  is positively related 
to the amount of land cultivated by the farmer.  
Comments:  The  larger  is  the  farmer’s  present  use  of  land  (both  from  the 
original endowment and from the rent) the higher would the revenue have to be to 
justify further land development. This result yields the prediction that larger farms 
should be associated with larger revenues per hectare and, at the same time, that higher 
uncertainty will tend to reduce the average farm size and to increase the observed 
revenue per hectare.  
Proposition  2:  In  the  case  of  a  production  technology  with  decreasing 
return  to  scale,  and  with  unlimited  alternatives,  if  farmers  face  with  the 
possibility  of  developing  new  land  with  continuity,  the  larger  the  size  of  the 
original holding, the larger is the level of the threshold at which the farmer is 
willing to develop new land.  
Comments: A farmer holding a smaller plot should be more willing to develop 
new land (i.e. acquire or rent in land), that is, his unit revenue threshold value should 
be smaller, than a farmer with a larger plot of land. This yields the prediction that 
larger endowments of land should be associated with higher revenues per hectare and 
more so, the higher the uncertainty. For a given development costs, the greater the 
uncertainty, the greater is the positive relation between the size of the holding and 
revenue per hectare. This correlation depends on the fact that, in order to expand his 
cultivation, the farmer requires that the value of the productivity of extra land acquired 
be greater or equal than his sunk cost  r . But this productivity is larger the smaller is 
the  size  of  the  holding.  This  effect  is  magnified  by  uncertainty.  Thus  we  should 
observe that the relationship between revenue per hectare and size of the holding is 
positive and larger the larger the uncertainty. 
 
2.2. Case 2: Indivisibility of land: Discontinuous supply of land 
 
In this section we assume that there is a discontinuous supply of land, that is, 
the farmer faces the opportunity to develop only a given amount of cultivated land. In 
contrast to case 1, the farmer has to decide when to exercise the option to develop an 
additional fixed amount of land.  
As before, we assume that the farmer cultivates a given amount of land  q. 
Denoting  with  r   the  present  value  of  developing  costs,  we  can  now  write  the 
following value matching condition:  
( )
1
1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
y y
f q A y f q q f q r q q
β
δ δ
+ = − + − −                 (2.15) 
Notice that this condition assumes that the farmer is unable to optimize by 
choosing the amount of land to be developed.  
Condition (2.15) states, in fact, that the value of the output that the farmer 
obtains cultivating his own endowment plus the option to develop land has to equate    11 
the value of the output that he can obtain developing land and cultivating his original 
piece of land minus the value he has to pay to obtain new land.  
Developing the value matching and the smooth pasting conditions yields the 
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This is the threshold yield value at which the farmer is willing to develop land.  
As before, it is of interest to analyze the relationship between the threshold 
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For  a  Cobb Douglas  production  function,  for  example,  ( ) f q Bq
γ =   and 
( ) f q Bq




















( ( ) ( ) )
1 ( )
y r B q q B q q





∂ − − −
=
∂ − −
                  (2.19) 
The sign of the relation will depend on the type of returns to scale. Condition 
(2.19) is greater than zero in presence of decreasing return to scale and conversely, is 
lower than zero for the case of increasing return to scale. In particular,  



























Proposition 3: In the case of homogenous technology and with discontinuous 
supply of land, that is, if a farmer can acquire new land in a given fixed amount, the 
threshold  value  of  the  revenue  per  hectare  is  increasing  with  the  size  of  the  area 
cultivated in the case of decreasing return to scale and is decreasing with the area 
cultivated in the case of increasing returns to scale.  
Comments: For example, under decreasing return to scale, small farmers will 
enter the rental market for levels of revenue per hectare lower than larger farmers. 
Propositions 3 and 5 state that a positive relation exists between threshold revenue 
levels  and  uncertainty.  The  higher  uncertainty,  the  larger  will  be  the  revenue  per 
hectare that will justify further land development.     12 
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                    (2.20) 
where  f  is evaluated at q q −  
If the production function is homogeneous of degree  r , one can easily prove 
the following:  



























Therefore, we can derive the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 4: Under homogeneous technology, when farmers are faced with 
prospect of developing land in a fixed amount, the threshold value of the stochastic 
revenue is smaller, the larger the size of the holding in the case of decreasing returns, 
and larger the larger the size of the holding otherwise.  
Comments:  When  uncertainty  rises,  the  value  of  1 β   decreases  (Dixit  and 
Pindyck,  1994)  and  the  threshold  value  decreases.  The  threshold  revenue  value 
represents the value of the yield at which it is optimal, for the farmer, to exercise the 
option, that is, acquire, rent or develop new land. Given the inverse relation between 
the threshold yield value  and the amount of  area owned, and the positive  relation 
between this threshold and the amount of area cultivated, the direct consequence is that 
larger farmers (in terms of size of the original holding) will tend to become larger 
when uncertainty  is associated to discontinuous supply of  land. Farmers  originally 
endowed  with  smaller  plots  of  land  may  thus  be  expected  to  be  develop  at 
disadvantage, when uncertainty is combined with discontinuous prospects to develop 
new land (which may also discriminate against them). The presence of land and capital 
imperfections thus, may be expected to favor the expansion plans of larger farms.  
The  empirical  literature  on  economies  of  scale  in  agriculture  has  pointed 
toward an 'L' shaped pattern for the average long run cost curve, so that, beyond a 
certain minimum level there are no increasing returns to scale, except under specific 
and  temporary  events  (Peterson  and  Kislev,  1991).  However,  many  studies  have 
identified an inverse relationship in developing countries justified by a more intensive 
use of land in smaller farms (Bharadwaj, 1974; Cornia, 1985). Verma and Bromley 
(1987)  underline  the  lack  of  conceptual  uniformity  in  analyzing  the  relationship 
between size and productivity and the limited focus on only one aspect of productivity, 
namely the output per unit of one of the inputs, typically land. As a result, the output 
per hectare has become a dominant policy measurement. A number of studies found a 
negative farm size productivity relationship for all but the smallest farm size classes 
(Berry and Cline, 1979; Carter, 1984; Newell et al., 1997; Kutcher and Scandizzo, 
1981; Udry, 1996), or have not been able to reject the hypothesis of constant returns to    13 
scale in agricultural production (Lanjouw, 1995; Feder and et al., 1992; Burgess, 1997; 
Dong  and  Putterman,  2000;  Wan  and  Cheng,  2001;  Olinto,  1995).  Some  of  the 
observed inverse relationship can be explained by differences in land quality, as large 
farmers tend to cultivate less fertile land and grow crops of lower output value (Bhalla 
and Roy, 1988; Benjamin, 1995). Yet, a significant inverse correlation is still observed 
in  empirical  studies  even  after  controlling  for  land  quality  and  other  differences 
associated with farm size. 
The  model  developed  here  suggests  a  different  type  of  inverse  relationship 
between farm size and productivity from the ones considered in the literature. If the 
hypothesis of decreasing return to scale in agriculture holds and there is continuous 
supply of land, the value of the threshold increases with the size of the holding. In 
other words, smaller farms are more likely to develop new land because they require a 
lower value of unit revenue to do so: they have more incentive to exercise the option to 
rent in instead of waiting. In the case of discontinuous supply of land, the relation 
becomes negative and larger farms will enter first the market.  
3. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION 
This section aims at testing the theoretical results developed in the previous 
one.  In  particular,  Proposition  3 6  state  two  main  results:  Both  in  the  case  of 
continuous and discontinuous supply of land and when the hypothesis of decreasing 
return to scale holds, the relationship between the threshold value of the revenue per 
hectare and the amount of land cultivated is positive. The direct conclusion is, in both 
cases, that uncertainty increases the value of the threshold unit revenue, so that an 
optimal strategy under uncertainty involves a longer waiting period before entering 
any  substantive  investment  in  land  development.  Furthermore,  according  with  our 
theoretical findings, the relationship between the threshold and the amount of land 
owned is positive in the case of continuous supply of land and negative when there is 
discontinuous supply of land. The direct consequence of this result is that, in the first 
case, smaller farms will be more willing to engage in land development or rent new 
land, while, in the second case, larger farms will show a higher propensity than smaller 
ones to develop new land. This also implies that we should expect lower levels of 
productivity to be associated, coeteris paribus, to smaller farms that develop new land, 
a finding often cited in the literature, only if the land market provides opportunities in 
a sufficiently continuous and “smooth” fashion. On the other hand, if new land to be 
developed is available only in discontinuous supply, i.e. in discrete plots of a given 
size, we should expect the opposite outcome, that is, higher unit revenues associated 
with larger farms.  
To assess the performance of land markets in Kyrgyz, we use panel data based 
on the Kyrgyz Republic Household Budget Survey (HBS) for the period 1998 2001 




3.1 Characteristic of the Data 
Table  1  presents  descriptive  statistics  for  the  household  characteristics  and 
welfare condition on the whole sample (Table 1).     14 
Table 1: Household Characteristics and Welfare Conditions 
 
     1998  1999  2000  2001 
Share of non poor households  %  44.19  45.18  43.71  53.84 
Share of poor households  %  33.46  32.86  29.34  30.05 
Share of very poor households  %  22.35  21.96  26.95  16.11 
Share of hh living in urban areas    34.8  34.74  34.71  34.96 
Share of hh living in rural areas    65.2  65.26  65.29  65.04 
Head male  %  71.94% 71.69% 76.68% 74.27% 
Age fo the head  year  45  45  47  46 
Education of the head  year  8.3  8.4  8.4  8.6 
Household size  number  5.21  5.23  5.34  5.11 
Has pension  %  14.63% 16.15% 19.65% 17.03% 
Share of income from labour  %  46.94% 45.41% 44.08% 48.30% 
Share of income from unearned activities  %  22.96% 22.43% 22.86% 17.73% 
Share of income from home produced goods  %  30.10% 32.09% 32.30% 33.97% 
Per capita consumption  US$/pc  245  175  169  197 
Exogenous per capita consumption at the district level & year  US$/pc  271  193  181  213 
Has water  %  32.55% 33.87% 33.08% 31.68% 
Area of dwelling per capita  sm/pc  18  17  17  17 
Has radio  %  30.10% 26.84% 27.58% 26.75% 
Has TV  %  85.00% 92.97% 93.12% 92.71% 
Has car  %  11.55% 14.85% 15.16% 15.77% 
Has motor bike or bicycle  %  12.31% 12.54% 12.40% 11.69% 
Has motor cycle  %  4.73%  5.31%  4.77%  5.24% 
Source: Author’s computation based on Kyrgyz HBS 1998-2001 
The table indicates that the average age of the family head is larger in non poor 
households compared to the poorer ones. The mean years of education of the head 
does not vary among the period and is, on average, the same for poor and non poor 
households (9 and 8 years respectively). However, when looking at rural and urban 
households, we can see that rural household’s heads tend to be older in rural areas 
compared to urban ones.  
In  addition,  larger  households  in  term  of  number  of  members  are  poorer 
families and live in rural areas. The household size remains constant between urban 
households in all periods but in 2001 decreases slightly among rural households.  
At  the  national  level,  in  1998,  income  from  labour  and  entrepreneurial 
activities constitute 46% of the total household’s income. The share of income from 
agriculture activities (and home produced goods) accounted only for 30%. In 2001, we 
observe a slightly increase in both the share of income from labour and agriculture 
activities and, at the same time, a decrease of income from unearned activities and 
disinvestments. Although income shares, during the same period, do not seem to be 
different between poor and non poor households, when looking at the rural and urban 
households we observe that the share of household income deriving from agriculture 
activities is higher for rural households, accounting for almost a half of total income in 
2001.  Urban  households  rely  predominantly  on  income  from  the  labour  market 
(between 73 and 75% in all the periods).  
Table  2 summarizes  households’ land market participation. Since 1991,  the 
Kyrgyz Republic’s original 470 collective and state farms have been divided into 869 
cooperatives  and  other  forms  of  still   collectivized  agriculture,  and  29,873  family 
farms and small group farms.     15 
Table 2: Land Market Participation 
 
     1998  1999  2000  2001 
Share of hh that has private land  %  75.97% 76.48% 75.25% 76.64% 
Share of hh that has land under temporary use  %  35.08%  7.14%  4.04%  11.50% 
Share of hh that has rent in land  %  5.81%  3.32%  10.95%  8.39% 
Share of hh that has land without authorization  %  2.37%  0.%  4.61%  3.24% 
Land cultivated  ha  1.28  1.54  1.06  1.30 
Land owned  ha      1.21  1.39 
Land under temporary use  ha      0.01  0.06 
Land rented in  ha      0.10  0.09 
Land used w/out authorization  ha        0.02  0.02 
  Source: Author’s computation based on Kyrgyz HBS 1998-2001 
 
The percentage of households who own land is about 76% in 1998 and does not 
seem to change in the whole period. Conversely, the share of households who hold 
land under temporary use decreases consistently from 35% in 1998 to 11% in 2001. At 
the same time, the share of households that rents in land increases from 5.81% in 1998 
to  8.39%  in  2001.  The  decrease  observed  from  2000  to  2001  is  due  to  the 
contemporary  increase  of  land  under  temporary  use  during  the  same  years.  The 
percentage of households that use land without authorization is, in the entire period, 
around 3%. Poor households seem to have higher probability to own land compared to 
the  non poor.  They  were  the  beneficiaries  of  land  reform.  The  share  of  poor 
households that owns land is, on average in the entire period, around 80%. Except for 
1999,  it  seems  that  richer  households  prefer  to  rent  in  land.  Preliminary  evidence 
suggests that Kyrgyz farmers are beginning to participate in the newly emerging land 
market. Households cultivated, on average, 1.28 ha of land. The amount has been, to 
some extent, stable in the whole period. The mean area rented amounts to 1.21 ha in 
2000 and 1.39 in 2001
3.  
At the beginning of the privatization process, poorer households cultivated 4.5 
times  less  land  than  richer  households.  The  hectares  of  land  cultivated  by  poor 
households remained stable during the four years but the difference is that the total 
amount of land cultivated by richer household has decreased, especially between 1999 
and 2000. Poor households own half the size of land of richer households. The mean 
size of the holding in 2000 was 1.75 ha, and 0.79 ha for non poor and poor households 
respectively.  In  2001  it  slightly  increased  for  non poor  households  to  1.97  ha and 
decreased  for  poor  ones  to  0.71  ha.  Households,  both  non poor and  poor,  rent  on 
average a small parcel of land. In 2000, the mean plot of land rented was 0.21 ha for 
richer households and 0.02 ha for poorer ones.  
Table 3 presents the main characteristics of the households in the four years 
according to size classes of cultivated land. The size classes are defined according to 
ascending size of cultivated land in arable land equivalent
4, except for the first class 
that includes all households that do not cultivate any land.  
                                                 
3 This data is not available in 1998 and 1999, whereas in the 2000 and 2001 surveys the land section is 
at the plot level. Therefore, the amount of land owned, rented in, temporarily used and used without 
authorization has been calculated.  
4 Different types of land have been reduced to arable equivalent by scaling by appropriate factors. The 
following weights have been applied to the different type of land: 0.6 to haymaking meadows and    16 
Table 3: Share of Households that Cultivates Land 
 
  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Do not cultivated land  33.77  34.76  30.54  29.78 
0<ha<=1  50.24  50  50.89  51.08 
1<ha<=2  8.47  8.04  10.29  10.43 
2<ha<=5  5.77  4.81  6.13  6.54 
>5  1.75  2.38  2.15  2.17 
  Source: Author’s computation based on Kyrgyz HBS 1998-2001 
Agriculture plays a central role in the lives of the rural population: in 2001 and 
on average in the whole period, 70% of households cultivate some land. Out of 70%, 
in 2001, 50% of the households cultivate, on average, between 0 and 1 ha of land. 10% 
cultivate between 1 and 2 ha, 6.5% cultivate between 2 and 5 ha of land and the 
remaining 2% cultivate more than 5 ha of land.  
The value of output from crop production per hectare of arable equivalent has 
decreased significantly from 1998 to 1999 and then considerably increased from 1999 
to 2000 (Table 4). The value of output from livestock per hectare of arable equivalent 
production seems to exhibit a U shape pattern. It has decreased from 1998 to 2000 and 
then increased again from 2000 to 2001. Poor households face higher level of output 
from crop production, whereas richer households obtained a larger part of production 
from livestock production. This is true for the entire period even though stabilization 
of the value is observed in 2000 and 2001 after the crisis undergone by the country, 
and, in particular, by the agriculture sector, in 1999.  
                                                                                                                                           
pasture land; 2 to orchards. The area under potatoes cultivation, the garden plot, the area under cereals, 
industrial crop, flowers, crops for fodder have been equalized to arable land.     17 
 
Table 4: Agriculture Endowment and Profitability 
 
     1998  1999  2000  2001 
Share of hh that produce crop   %  74.36%  73.59%  73.94%  74.56% 
Share of hh that produce livestock  %  48.81%  49.67%  51.84%  55.63% 
Value of output from crop production/ha  US$/ha  322  264  400  389 
Value of output from livestock production/ha  US$/ha  454  340  315  363 
Value of total output/ha  US$/ha  631  609  861  778 
Value of inputs from crop production  US$  12  10  14  16 
Value of inputs from livestock production  US$  149  140  103  91 
Share of hh that pay land work fee  %  81.91%  80.18%  76.95%  79.48% 
Share of hh that use fertilizer   %  16.27%  13.18%  14.87%  17.38% 
Share of hh that use crop from feeds  %  65.83%  64.35%  68.09%  30.11% 
Has animals  %  43.67%  40.99%  40.95%  42.02% 
Number of animals  number  0.89  0.85  0.85  3.37 
Has agriculture machinery  %       5.67%  5.89% 
Number of agriculture machinery  number        0.03  0.02 
Source: Author’s computation based on Kyrgyz HBS 1998-2001 
 
Input  value  is  higher  in  livestock  production  compared  to  crop  production. 
Inputs from livestock production account for 20% of total output per hectare in 1998. 
In 2001, the value of input from livestock production decreased compared to the value 
of total output
5.  
The share of households that own agriculture machinery is very low: 5.89% in 
2001
6. The percentage is lower when comparing poor and non poor households. In 
Kyrgyz,  collective  and  state  farms  concentrate  more  than  80%  of  all  agricultural 
equipment including tractors and harvesters. This makes smaller farms dependent on 
larger ones. This phenomenon can be evidenced looking at the share of households that 
pay land work fee (that can be considered as a proxy of the rental for agriculture 
machinery): 80% of households in 2001 paid land work fee. This share is, on average, 
of  poor  households.  Therefore,  private  farms  have  higher  expenses  on  renting 
equipment and other services. Their performance may thus be highly affected, given 
the high share of households that have to use agricultural equipment and other means 
of production that remained in collective and state farms.  
 
3.2 Estimation Strategy and methodology 
In order to outline the model for the empirical testing, consider farm revenue 
from  agriculture  production  ( it v )  as  composed  of  a  systematic  part  ( it Q )  and  a 
stochastic part ( it y ). 
it it it v y Q =                   (3.1) 
                                                 
5 It has not been possible to calculate the total households’ profit because of the lack of information 
regarding  the  salary  of  hired  worker  and  the  time  spent,  for  each  household  member,  in  on farm 
activities.  
6 No data on this variable are available for 1998 and 1999.     18 
Taking the logarithm of both sides of (1) yields: 
log log log it it it v y Q = +               (3.2) 
The  variation  of  the  systematic  component  ( it Q )  can  be  explained  by  a 
production  function,  describing  how  output  varies  across  farms  and  over  time  as 
function  of  the  inputs  used  in  production  plus  a  certain  number  of  household 
characteristics  (“shifters”  such  as:  age  and  education  of  the  head,  household  size, 
animals and agriculture machinery ownership). For simplicity and in order to make the 
notation less cumbersome, the shifters will be omitted from the equation. 
1
log log log log
J
it it j jit it
j
Q y X y α
=
+ = + ∑           (3.3) 
where  1... j J =  denotes the inputs used in production.  
Therefore: 
log it it i it y v u ε = = +  
The stochastic term can be decomposed into two components: the first,  i v , 
refers to the variability across farms (cross sectional variation), and the second,  it u , 
captures how much of the variance is due to the variability within farm (time series 
variation). 
We assume that farmers cultivate their endowment. They pay a fix cost  c for 
each unit of land cultivated (the costs include both investment in land improvement 
and maintenance costs). 
For simplicity all factors are fixed except land. We assume that the stochastic 
part of the revenue is distributed around the entry value (persistence) 
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Equation (3.3) becomes: 
log log log ( , ) log *
log log ( , ) ( , )
Q y Q x q y v
Q Q x q g c v σ
+ = + +
⇒ = + +
          (3.5) 
where  x  denotes  any  shifter.  For  the  case  of  a  Cobb Douglas  production 
function, in particular,  
γ αx Bq x q Q = ) , (                 (3.6) 
where x is a shifter or a vector of shifters    19 
The systematic and the stochastic part of the revenue will be, respectively: 
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Substituting into equation (3.4), we obtain:  
1
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log( ) log log log log
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Note that on the basis of this equation, we can formulate three specific predictions: 






b.  a positive coefficient, again not significantly different from one for the 
land variable 
c.  a negative coefficient for land elasticity α  
Also this coefficient should not significantly differ from one. However since 
we cannot estimate  α  for each farm, we can use the other factors and shifters to 
measure  α  differences across farms and times. This implies that we should expect 
negative coefficients for factors or shifters that are complement to land and positive for 
substitutes.  
 
3.3 Econometric results 
 
In order to test empirically the equation developed above we have estimated a 
set of random effect linear regressions on the logarithm of the value of the revenue 
(from  crop  and  livestock  production).  Tables  5 8  summarize  the  results  of  the 
regressions.  
We have used the entire period 1998 2001 and have performed, in Table 5, a 
random effect linear regression for the households with non negative revenue on the 
unbalanced panel. Table 6 shows the same results for the unbalanced panel of the 
households that rent in land (tenants).    20 
Table 5: Random Effect Linear Regression: Total Revenue Unbalanced panel 
1998 2001 
 
  ρ δ 
1% 
ρ  δ 
2% 
ρ  δ 
3% 
ρ  δ 
10% 
ρ  δ 
20% 
ρ  δ 
30% 
ρ  δ 
40% 
ρ  δ 
50% 




0.845***  0.882***  0.886***  0.895***  0.901***  0.908***  0.915***  0.922***  0.929*** 
  (23.33)  (24.66)  (24.83)  (25.24)  (25.44)  (25.61)  (25.81)  (26.04)  (26.29) 
Log value of 
inputs 
0.556***  0.546***  0.544***  0.538***  0.535***  0.533***  0.531***  0.528***  0.525*** 
  (39.35)  (38.91)  (38.82)  (38.55)  (38.39)  (38.24)  (38.08)  (37.91)  (37.75) 
Log number of 
adults 
0.505***  0.521***  0.524***  0.528***  0.530***  0.531***  0.532***  0.532***  0.532*** 
  (11.58)  (12.09)  (12.16)  (12.34)  (12.40)  (12.45)  (12.48)  (12.52)  (12.55) 
Log household 
head age 
 0.002   0.011   0.012   0.013   0.013   0.014   0.015   0.016   0.018 
  (0.04)  (0.17)  (0.19)  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.23)  (0.25)  (0.27)  (0.31) 
Dummy animals  0.221***  0.238***  0.240***  0.245***  0.248***  0.252***  0.256***  0.260***  0.263*** 
  (4.88)  (5.28)  (5.34)  (5.49)  (5.57)  (5.66)  (5.76)  (5.86)  (5.96) 
Log beta/beta 1 ♠   0.039  0.815***  0.929***  1.190***  1.248***  1.266***  1.295***  1.341***  1.401*** 
  (0.89)  (8.67)  (9.67)  (11.97)  (12.60)  (12.93)  (13.38)  (14.00)  (14.76) 
Constant  1.696***  0.983***  0.901***  0.716***  0.669***  0.649***  0.623**  0.587**  0.542** 
  (6.52)  (3.96)  (3.64)  (2.90)  (2.72)  (2.64)  (2.54)  (2.40)  (2.22) 
Observations  3863  3863  3863  3863  3863  3863  3863  3863  3863 
Number of id  1239  1239  1239  1239  1239  1239  1239  1239  1239 
Source: Author’s computation based on Kyrgyz HBS 1998-2001 
 
Table 6: Random Effect Linear Regression: Total Revenue Unbalanced panel of 
Tenants: 1998 2001 
 
  ρ  δ 
1% 
ρ  δ 
2% 
ρ  δ 
3% 
ρ  δ 
10% 
Log land cultivated  0.642***  0.664***  0.666***  0.671*** 
  (5.53)  (5.76)  (5.78)  (5.83) 
Log value of inputs  0.741***  0.728***  0.727***  0.724*** 
  (11.93)  (11.78)  (11.78)  (11.77) 
Log number of adults  0.554***  0.565***  0.564***  0.561*** 
  (3.41)  (3.53)  (3.53)  (3.54) 
Log household head 
age 
 0.438*   0.419*   0.417*   0.410* 
  (1.78)  (1.70)  (1.69)  (1.67) 
Dummy animals  0.118  0.138  0.140  0.145 
  (0.74)  (0.88)  (0.89)  (0.93) 
Log beta/beta 1 ♠   0.021  1.000**  1.065**  1.252** 
  (0.08)  (2.07)  (2.19)  (2.54) 
Constant  2.762**  1.882*  1.829*  1.670 
  (2.44)  (1.83)  (1.78)  (1.62) 
Observations  278  278  278  278 
Number of id  230  230  230  230 
♠ We use variance of total revenue, because we assume that total revenue, v yQ = , so that 
log log log v y Q = +  and var(log ) var(log ) v y =  since logQ  is assumed non stochastic 
Source: Author’s computation based on Kyrgyz HBS 1998-2001 
 
A second set of regressions is presented in Tables 7 and 8. Although our data 
cover  the  period  1998 2001,  we  have  restricted  the  analysis  to  the  last  two  years 
because we had better data for this sample. In particular, Table 7 uses the balanced 
panel and summarizes the results for the households with non negative revenue. As 
before, in Table 8 we repeat the same analysis but restricting the sample to the tenants.     21 




  ρ  δ 
1% 
ρ  δ 
2% 
ρ  δ 
3% 
ρ  δ 
10% 
ρ  δ 
20% 
ρ  δ 
30% 
ρ  δ 
40% 
ρ  δ 
50% 
ρ  δ 
60% 
Log land cultivated  0.979***  0.986***  0.991***  1.001***  1.007***  1.010***  1.013***  1.017***  1.020*** 
  (18.65)  (18.75)  (18.82)  (19.01)  (19.08)  (19.11)  (19.13)  (19.17)  (19.24) 
Log value of inputs  0.388***  0.388***  0.387***  0.387***  0.386***  0.386***  0.386***  0.385***  0.385*** 
  (18.63)  (18.61)  (18.60)  (18.60)  (18.59)  (18.57)  (18.56)  (18.55)  (18.55) 
Log number of 
adults 
0.241***  0.245***  0.248***  0.256***  0.259***  0.260***  0.261***  0.261***  0.262*** 
  (4.45)  (4.52)  (4.58)  (4.73)  (4.79)  (4.81)  (4.83)  (4.84)  (4.87) 
Log household 
head age 
0.201*  0.199*  0.197*  0.188*  0.183*  0.181*  0.180*  0.178*  0.176* 
  (1.94)  (1.91)  (1.89)  (1.80)  (1.75)  (1.73)  (1.72)  (1.70)  (1.68) 
Dummy animals  0.270***  0.271***  0.272***  0.275***  0.276***  0.276***  0.276***  0.277***  0.277*** 
  (4.13)  (4.15)  (4.16)  (4.20)  (4.22)  (4.23)  (4.23)  (4.24)  (4.25) 
Log beta/beta 1 ♠   0.097  0.055  0.156  0.441**  0.531***  0.554***  0.576***  0.612***  0.668*** 
  (0.58)  (0.31)  (0.83)  (2.19)  (2.65)  (2.81)  (2.96)  (3.17)  (3.48) 
Constant  2.027***  1.899***  1.820***  1.607***  1.543***  1.526***  1.508***  1.477***  1.433*** 
  (4.70)  (4.38)  (4.18)  (3.68)  (3.54)  (3.50)  (3.47)  (3.40)  (3.30) 
Observations  1482  1482  1482  1482  1482  1482  1482  1482  1482 
Number of id  741  741  741  741  741  741  741  741  741 
♠ We use variance of total revenue, because we assume that total revenue, v yQ = , so that 
log log log v y Q = +  and var(log ) var(log ) v y =  since logQ  is assumed non stochastic 
Source: Author’s computation based on Kyrgyz HBS 1998-2001 
 
Table 8: Random Effect Linear Regression: Total Revenue Unbalanced panel for 
Tenants 2000 2001 
 
 
  ρ  δ 
1% 
ρ  δ 
2% 
ρ  δ 
3% 
ρ  δ 
10% 
Log land cultivated  0.614***  0.651***  0.651***  0.650*** 
  (4.45)  (4.76)  (4.76)  (4.75) 
Log value of inputs  0.627***  0.595***  0.595***  0.597*** 
  (8.81)  (8.45)  (8.44)  (8.47) 
Log number of adults  0.536***  0.546***  0.546***  0.546*** 
  (3.51)  (3.67)  (3.67)  (3.66) 
Log  household  head 
age 
0.041  0.054  0.054  0.053 
  (0.16)  (0.21)  (0.21)  (0.21) 
Dummy animals   0.069   0.020   0.019   0.022 
  (0.44)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.14) 
Log beta/beta 1 ♠  0.805*  2.495***  2.501***  2.420*** 
  (1.66)  (3.12)  (3.12)  (3.04) 
Constant   0.115   0.277   0.281   0.225 
  (0.08)  (0.23)  (0.23)  (0.19) 
Observations  160  160  160  160 
Number of id  114  114  114  114 
♠ We use variance of total revenue, because we assume that total revenue, v yQ = , so that 
log log log v y Q = +  and var(log ) var(log ) v y =  since logQ  is assumed non 
stochastic 
  Source: Author’s computation based on Kyrgyz HBS 1998-2001 
 
In  all  the  regressions,  the  dependent  variable  is  the  logarithm  of  the  total 
revenue  (from  crop  and  livestock  production).  The  set  of  dependent  variables  (all    22 
measured  in  logarithms,  includes:  t  the  age  of  family  head,  the  amount  of  land 
cultivated, the value of total inputs in production, the number of adults as a proxy of 
labour input, a dummy for animal ownership and the variable that reflects uncertainty, 
that is, the logarithm of  1
β
β − .  
In each table different regressions have been run by varying the value of  β , 
and, therefore  1
β
β − . For each regression we have used a different percentage (from 1 
to 60%) of the difference between the discount rate,  ρ , and the parameter δ  of the 
beta equation. This difference summarizes the percentage growth of farm revenue that 
the holder of the option is foregoing, in order to keep alive the option to develop land. 
For example, a value of 10% of the difference  ρ δ −  means that, in order to keep his 
option to develop land in the future, the owner of the land is giving up a 10% increase 
of the revenue that he could earn by developing additional land. 
We find, in all regressions, that total revenue is positively related to the amount 
of land cultivated, input use, and the number of adults, that can be used as a proxy for 
family labour. On the whole, the estimates seem to corroborate the profit maximization 
model, thereby suggesting that farmers maybe able to choose their investment with a 
certain continuity. The age of the household head does not seem to affect the revenue. 
If  markets  were  perfect,  household  size  and  land  endowment  should  not  affect 
production  decisions.  However,  there  is  a  common  consensus  that  points  towards 
imperfections in land and labour markets (Holden et al., 2001) in the rural sector where 
there is a significant presence of inputs endowment.  
As  survey  information  on  the  number  of  animals  owned  is  unreliable,  we 
constructed a dummy variable to identify whether a household owned animals. The 
variable is significant and positively related to revenue.  
The coefficient of the variable  1
β
β −  is positive and significant in most of the 
regressions starting from a level of 2% of the rate of growth of the revenue. When the 
analysis is restricted to the balanced panel 2000 2001  (Table 7)  we need a  higher 
percentage (20%) of the revenue in order to find the coefficient significantly different 
from zero. Except for table 8, in all the regressions, a lower value of the growth rate of 
the revenue (1%) makes the coefficient of the beta variable non significant. The value 
of the coefficient, on the other hand, is not significantly different from 1 or tends 
asymptotically to 1 in all regressions, thereby validating the theoretical model (Figure 
1). 
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Figure 1
Relation between (ρ δ) and the coefficients 























Coeff. log land cultivated Coeff. Log beta/beta 1
   Source: Author’s computation based on Kyrgyz HBS 1998-2001 
 
The same conclusion can be drawn for the coefficient of the variable of land 
cultivated. In all the regressions it is positive, non significantly different from 1 at the 
1% confidence level.  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS  
The  issue  of  irreversibility,  uncertainty  and  environmental  policy  has  been 
largely discussed in the last three decades. Starting from the pioneering paper of Arrow 
and Fisher (1974), the concept of option value or quasi option value has been extended 
by several authors (Conrad, 1980; Hanemann, 1989; Krutilla and Fisher, 1975; Dixit 
and Pindyck, 1994).  
In this study we have extended the analysis of real option value to the case of 
agriculture  land  development.  This  topic  is  of  particular  importance  especially  in 
Eastern European countries that have experienced a privatization process in the last 10 
years.  
In this context of large uncertainty about institutional and economical changes, 
the decision to develop new land, in the agriculture sector, remains a key question for 
every farmer. The remaining legal restrictions in the sale market or the presence of 
high transaction costs in the rental market suggest that a better strategy could be to 
wait before entering any investment in land development. 
The results of the model are the following. Both in the case of continuous and 
discontinuous supply of land and when the hypothesis of decreasing return to scale 
holds, the relation between the threshold value of revenue per hectare and the amount 
of land cultivated is positive. The direct conclusion is, in both cases, that uncertainty 
increases the value of the threshold. The relation between the threshold and the amount 
of land owned, that is, the size of the holding is positive in the case of continuous 
supply of land and negative when there is discontinuous supply of land. The direct    24 
consequence is that, in the first case, smaller farms will be more willing to rent land 
and exercise the option where, in the second case, larger farms will exercise first. This 
result  tends  to  corroborate  the  evidence  that  happened  in  EEC  and  FSU.  When 
distribution of land was chosen, therefore when there was a “continuous supply” of 
land, small farms developed first. In the case of restitution, land was available in larger 
quantity, larger farms developed first, and contributed to create large cooperative.  
Future  interesting  issues  concerning  the  application  of  real  option  value 
technique to land development are the introduction, in the theoretical model, of other 
factors affecting the decision to develop land. Variables related to labour and credit 
markets can be introduced in the model in order to verify changes in the sign and 
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